We live in times of change, uncertainty and opportunity - and this has an impact on every aspect of the work of this organization. The urgent need to evolve sustainable development strategies requires that objective consideration be given to the role of nuclear energy in these strategies. The imperative to ensure a high level of safety for all nuclear facilities around the world requires the development and management of a comprehensive and legally binding safety regime supported by an enhanced safety culture. The realistic possibility, with the end of the cold war, to curb nuclear weapons proliferation and to move towards nuclear disarmament, depends critically on the availability of an effective system of verification. And the need to raise the standard of living of the world's poorest requires the efficient transfer of technology, including nuclear technology.
The IAEA was established 41 years ago to be the focal point for international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peace and development. Our role as an objective institution that serves as a centre for standard setting, independent analysis, expert advice, technology transfer and impartial oversight and verification is more relevant than ever. In these remarks, my intention is to highlight the role of the Agency in four areas: energy, safety, verification and technology transfer. I will then turn briefly to the process of programme and management review which I have initiated to ensure that the Agency maintains and enhances its record as an effective and efficient organization.
I begin with a summary of trends in global energy supply. Today the growth of nuclear power is at a standstill in Western Europe and North America, while expanding in parts of Asia and Eastern Europe. At the end of 1997, 437 nuclear reactors operating in 31 countries provided about 17 per cent of global electricity supply, slightly lower than the previous year. In the past 18 months, construction has commenced on six new plants. In addition, six plants have been connected to the grid, but eight plants have been taken out of service. Several existing reactors are now approaching the end of their design life. Decisions must be made to extend their time in service, to replace them with new plants or to find other options. And decisions must be made as well with respect to the accumulation of spent fuel and radioactive wastes.
Global electricity demand is growing, driven mainly by developing countries with expanding populations. By the year 2050 it is projected to increase two to three fold depending on the economic growth scenario. Concerns about potential global warming are also increasing. Discussions held last December in Kyoto, within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, resulted in agreement by industrialized countries on global and national targets and timetables for reducing their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), particularly carbon dioxide. Energy produced from fossil fuels accounts for more than half of human-made GHG emissions. By contrast, the present use of nuclear power accounts for the avoidance of about eight per cent of global carbon emissions. Except for nuclear or hydro power (which has limited growth potential), there are not yet any other economically viable, minimal-GHG-emission, options for base load power generation.
The structure of the global electricity sector is changing. In several countries, energy markets are being deregulated and privatized to create a more competitive energy supply market. Power plant operators are searching for greater efficiency from existing plants and greater economy to reduce costs. On several grounds, including the comparatively high initial capital cost of new nuclear power plants and questions of public acceptance, new investment has tended to focus on combined cycle natural gas power plants which have lower GHG emissions than coal or oil plants.
Several challenges emerge as a result of these changes: managing safely, efficiently and competitively, now and in the future, operating nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities; ensuring that there is no sacrifice of safety for the sake of profitability; and making sure that global environmental emissions commitments are factored into objective considerations of alternative energy system options.
The Agency's work in nuclear power reactor technology development is guided by International Working Groups (IWGs) which act as forums for the exchange of information and assist the Secretariat in planning and implementing activities. These IWGs cover different types of reactors (gas-cooled, light water, heavy water and fast reactors), as well as specific fields such as training and qualification, instrumentation and control, and plant life management.
In the area of non-electrical applications of nuclear power, the Agency's programme focuses on nuclear desalination, an area in which it now benefits from the advice and guidance of the recently established International Nuclear Desalination Advisory Group. Work is also continuing on small and medium size reactors - for desalination as well as for electricity generation either in remote locations or for limited electric grids.
It is worthwhile mentioning at this point activities under way in the area of controlled thermonuclear fusion. Promising co-operative research and engineering design is being undertaken in the framework of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project. The Agency lends its support by issuing the ITER Newsletter and publishing the considerable amount of technical information produced by ITER, and by contributing nuclear, atomic and molecular data. A fully integrated design of the ITER machine is now available. It needs, however, to be complemented by site-specific adaptation of the design to provide the necessary technical basis for a decision to proceed with construction. As presently designed, the ITER project has been estimated to cost about $10 billion. But under the present economic circumstances, the ITER Parties have asked that a lower cost option, approximately half the estimated price, be prepared. Such a design version should be ready by the end of this year.
With varying degrees of urgency, both developed and developing countries are faced with major energy choices to meet the needs of their economies. While there are many reasons why national authorities and energy investors may choose the nuclear power option - proven technology, cost factors, environmental considerations, national security of supply - it is important to have available the tools for objective comparative assessment between nuclear and other sources of energy. With this in mind, and in close co-operation with eight other international organizations, the Agency has developed the tools and methodologies for the comparative assessment of different energy chains and conversion technology options through the 'DECADES' project (Databases and Methodologies for Comparative Assessment of Different Energy Sources for Electricity Generation). The comparisons include energy demand and supply options, economic analysis, the health and environmental impacts, the risks of energy systems, and sustainable energy development.
The DECADES methodological framework is being used by some 35 Member States to conduct their own independent energy option analyses. Following three years of database establishment and model development and dissemination to Member States, the DECADES Steering Committee will meet later this year to review the progress made by the project in different areas and to propose new directions for future activities. The Agency is also contributing to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Third Assessment Report and to the UN Commission on Sustainable Development which, for the first time, will address energy issues.
The choice of nuclear power and of a particular energy mix are national decisions. The Agency, however, has a central role in ensuring that a full and fair hearing continues to be given to nuclear power and that policy makers have an objective assessment of all the options available to them. Nuclear power is an important component of many national energy strategies, together with improvement of energy efficiency, and the use of renewable energy sources and clean technologies for improved use of fossil fuels. It is essential that the nuclear power option remains available. It should not be ruled out on subjective grounds.
I would like to highlight at this point an area of particular concern: spent fuel and radioactive waste management. Spent fuel from research and test reactors is of considerable concern because of the substantial quantities that have become physically degraded and exist in ageing storage facilities which represent potential health, safety and environmental problems at many sites. In addition, spent fuel from power reactors has also accumulated rapidly. The current global stock is about 200,000 tonnes. By 2010, the accumulated quantities are projected to be about 340,000 tonnes. At present, existing and planned storage capacity will keep ahead of accumulated inventories, but there is concern that in some countries the resources will not be available to construct the planned facilities. For countries with small nuclear programmes, and therefore relatively small amounts of spent fuel and radioactive waste, regional co-operative arrangements for the management of spent fuel and waste may be an attractive prospect.
The steady accumulation of plutonium in separated form and in spent fuel is a question that also deserves urgent attention. In the civilian sector, about 170 tonnes of separated plutonium is in storage. An additional 100 tonnes will be released from the military programmes of the USA and the Russian Federation and some 1000 tonnes are contained in spent fuel from reactors. Presently, three options for plutonium management are being discussed: burning in reactors, immobilization in a suitable matrix and subsequent disposal, and long term storage. It is hoped that, through international co-operation, a common understanding will emerge on the best ways to deal with this and other fuel cycle issues. It is to these ends that in 1998 the Agency established an IWG on Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options.
Low and intermediate level waste is generated both by the nuclear power sector and by the medical, industrial, agricultural and research sectors through the use of radioisotopes. In most industrialized countries, about sixty per cent of the total volume of this type of waste is generated by the energy sector, while some forty per cent comes from the other sectors. The fact that some 350 cubic metres of low and intermediate level waste is generated by one year of operation of a 1000 MW(e) nuclear power plant gives an indication of the total global volume of such waste. Therefore, treatment for minimizing the volume of such waste for storage and disposal requires improved management systems. Through the assessment of different technologies and the dissemination of information, the Agency is supporting Member States in properly addressing low and intermediate level waste management issues. But the need for Member States to develop disposal plans and operate disposal facilities remains an urgent matter.
Experts agree that technical solutions exist for the safe and permanent disposal of high level radioactive wastes. However, progress in demonstrating these solutions has not been as rapid as originally foreseen, with the opening of actual repositories being delayed again and again. One exception is the recent certification for operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico for the permanent disposal of long lived radioactive wastes. Decisions on the final disposal of waste can be delayed but cannot be avoided. I urge all Member States to focus on this important and pressing issue and not to rule out regional or international solutions. I am concerned that the longer this issue remains a public concern, the more difficult it will be for nuclear power to significantly contribute to sustainable development.
Although the Radioactive Waste Safety Standards programme of the Agency is steadily forging the necessary international consensus on the conditions for the safe disposal of radioactive waste, public opinion seems to be increasingly reluctant to accept the technical advice given. One week ago, a major international conference on the subject took place in Hamburg in Germany. A lesson derived from that conference is that more extensive information exchange is needed. The Agency is prepared to take up this challenge through the organization of a forum for information exchange that would be open to all concerned parties
Over the past year the global safety record for nuclear power plants has shown continued improvement as a result of peer reviews, the increased safety awareness of power plant managers and the substantial international assistance programmes to upgrade plants built to earlier standards. The incidents which were reported to the joint IAEA /NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency) Incident Reporting System were problems that were detected and corrected well before any actual health or environmental impact could result.
However, the Agency's annual Nuclear Safety Review details other events concerning management practices in nuclear power plants which provide a warning that even well developed nuclear power programmes can experience a gradual deterioration in safety performance unless there are continuous efforts to maintain and improve nuclear safety. And continued incidents involving radiation sources, such as the atmospheric release of caesium-137, albeit in insignificant quantities, from a scrap metal furnace in Spain, the discovery of several unshielded radiation sources in Georgia and recent revelations of contamination of transport containers in Europe, underline the need for effective safety practices throughout the entire nuclear fuel cycle. One key aspect concerns the security of radioactive material - a subject which was discussed extensively last week at an international conference organized in Dijon in France jointly with INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization and the European Union.
Although nuclear safety is a national responsibility, it is also a global public concern. The Agency's aim is to develop a comprehensive nuclear safety regime that consists of three elements: international agreements; safety standards; and measures to provide for the application of those agreements and standards.
In recent years, several important international conventions, negotiated under the Agency's auspices, have helped to fill gaps in the international nuclear safety regime. Of particular interest is the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the objective of which is to achieve and maintain a consistently high level of safety at nuclear power plants around the world. An organizational meeting of Contracting Parties will be held next week to prepare for the first Review Meeting in April 1999. Next week is also the deadline for Contracting Parties to submit their national reports on compliance with their obligations. The coming months, therefore, will provide the first test for the Convention's system of international peer review of national reports.
For a comprehensive safety regime to be established, States must subscribe to the conventions they have adopted. I should mention that the pace of ratification of the different conventions concluded under the auspices of the Agency is uneven. For example, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste, which was opened for signature during last year's General Conference and which requires ratification by 25 States, at least 15 of which have operating nuclear power plants, to enter into force, has been ratified by only three States.
The second element of our safety programme is the development of internationally agreed safety standards which cover the areas of nuclear, radiation, waste management and transport. The Agency's Safety Standards Series represents international consensus on safety requirements and their implementation. It is important that they be comprehensive, scientifically accurate and current. In the present biennium we have undertaken the preparation or revision of the entire corpus of safety standards - a total of some seventy documents. The quality of these standards derives from the input provided by Member States, Agency staff and the advisory groups of experts that oversee the programme. This work will be largely completed in the next biennium, after which the focus of our work will shift to the implementation of these standards.
You will recall that the Diplomatic Conference convened last September to adopt the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management also adopted a resolution relating to the transboundary movement of radioactive waste and spent fuel. Immediately after, the General Conference adopted a related resolution. Since then, many consultations on the safety of transport of radioactive materials have taken place, including consultations at the June meeting of the Board of Governors, and the issue will be discussed again at this General Conference. I hope that consensus will be reached on this important issue.
It is not enough to adopt safety standards and measures - the priority is to ensure their application in an effective manner. This is the third element of our safety programme. The Agency offers a wide range of services, including several peer review services, information exchange, education and training, and co-ordination of safety related research and development. These are valuable services that all Member States should utilize. Peer reviews of operating nuclear power plants, such as the Operational Safety Review Team services (OSARTs) should be a tool routinely used by Member States to ensure that operating practices are consistent with best practices. OSART services have been refined in the light of the experience gained. I am pleased to report that later this year the one hundredth OSART mission will be conducted - to the Golfech nuclear power plant in France, this will also be the tenth OSART mission to be conducted in France.
Agency safety services are also used to study specific issues. This year we will issue a comprehensive final report on the 1990-1998 Agency extrabudgetary programme on analysing and upgrading the safety levels of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe. One of the goals of this programme was the building of an international consensus on the safety issues of WWER and RBMK nuclear power plants and on the priority measures required for safety improvements. The report also provides a technical basis for the development of further work, for example on further strengthening national regulatory authorities.
Upon a joint request by the Slovak and Austrian Governments, we assembled an independent group of internationally recognized experts to examine concerns raised about embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel in the Mochovce Unit 1 nuclear power plant. The experts met from 14 to 18 September to review technical data and formulate their findings. The Slovak Government has also requested the Agency to perform a review of the design modifications which have been made to the plant. And in response to an invitation from the Government of Ukraine, the Agency organized a workshop in Kiev last June to deal with cracking of large diameter pipes in RBMK reactors.
I would also like to inform you of the work of the Secretariat concerning the year 2000 (Y2K) computer system problems that the Agency as well as Member States must face in the near future. I have asked Departments to draw up action plans to assist Member States in addressing this issue by compiling information and developing documents providing guidance for the identification of Y2K problems, together with the necessary remedial action, and by offering a forum for information exchange. Such an action plan has already been prepared in the area of the safety of nuclear installations and is available on the Agency's WorldAtom Internet home page.
This year saw the completion of the fourth in a series of Agency assessments of the radiological legacies from past military activities and waste disposal practices. The study of the present and future impact of the radiological situation at the atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa in French Polynesia, which was carried out at the request of the French Government, involved the participation of 55 experts and 18 laboratories under the supervision of an International Advisory Committee. The conclusion - that there would not be any health effects that could be diagnosed or discerned attributable to exposure to the radiation from residual radioactive materials remaining at the atolls - was reviewed and confirmed at an international scientific conference in June. It should provide welcome assurance to the people of the South Pacific region. However, other studies carried out by the Agency in other areas have come to different conclusions. States may wish to benefit from similar radiological studies of former nuclear weapon test sites to help overcome this legacy of the cold war.
The hopes for a safer and more secure world rest crucially on advancing the agenda for nuclear arms reduction and their eventual elimination. An effective verification system is indispensable to the realization of these hopes.
Over 180 States have committed themselves to IAEA comprehensive safeguards. In 1997, safeguards were applied to over 900 facilities involving more than 10,000 days of inspection. On the basis of these activities, the Agency Safeguards Statement for 1997 concluded that, in fulfilling its safeguards obligations, the Secretariat did not find any indication that nuclear material and facilities which had been declared and placed under safeguards had been diverted for non-peaceful ends, or that safeguarded facilities, equipment or non-nuclear material were being misused.
Since 1991, and as a result of the Agency's experience in Iraq, it has become clear that effective safeguards must provide assurance not only about nuclear activities declared by a State but also about the absence of any undeclared activities. Efforts since that time have aimed at developing a cost effective system that deals with both declared and possible undeclared activities.
With the approval by the Board of Governors last year of the Model Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreements, the Agency has obtained the legal authority to implement a more effective safeguards system that affords the Agency a vantage point from which to develop a more comprehensive picture than before of all nuclear activities in a State and to detect and verify possible non-peaceful activities at an early stage. The challenge now is to ensure that all States conclude and implement Additional Protocols. The strengthened safeguards system is a fundamental condition for an effective non-proliferation regime.
I am pleased to be able to report that good progress is being made in the conclusion of these Protocols. With the ten Additional Protocols already signed, and the Additional Protocols for twenty-two States approved by the Board which we expect to be signed in the coming days, a considerable portion of the world's nuclear fuel cycle which is under comprehensive safeguards will be subject to strengthened safeguards. But that is not enough.
One of the main purposes of the strengthened safeguards system - to provide assurance about the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States with legally binding non-proliferation commitments - can be better achieved with global adherence. I would therefore urge all States with outstanding safeguards agreements to conclude them and I would also urge all States to accelerate their consideration of the Model Additional Protocol and enter into consultations with the Agency at the earliest possible opportunity. We should work together to ensure that by the year 2000 all States have concluded outstanding safeguards agreements and also the Additional Protocol.
In implementing the strengthened safeguards system, the Agency's objective is to achieve optimum effectiveness and efficiency by meshing fully the traditional nuclear material accountancy system with the new system. In keeping with the commitment to overall cost neutrality, work is in progress on integrated safeguards implementation. In addition to already completed guidelines for the preparation and submission of declarations pursuant to the Additional Protocol, guidelines are being prepared with regard to the implementation of the complementary access provisions of the Model Protocol. The organizational structure for evaluating safeguards-relevant information has been strengthened and steady progress is being made in performing State-wide evaluations. Valuable experience with complementary access is being gained under the Australian Additional Protocol.
Verification information from digital surveillance cameras, electronic seals and other monitoring devices installed in Switzerland, South Africa, Japan and Canada in different types of facilities, is being transmitted via authenticated and encrypted communication links to IAEA headquarters. We expect remote monitoring to be introduced on a routine basis early next year.
In my statement to the Board of Governors in June this year, in the context of the nuclear weapons tests conducted in May, I pointed to the widespread concern at the possible erosion of the basic norm of the non-proliferation regime, namely that, "pending nuclear disarmament, world security is better served with fewer rather than more nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon States." I also underscored the need to accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament. In addition to a complete ban on nuclear testing, two actions have always been identified as indispensable: freezing the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such materials, either unilaterally or through disarmament agreements. I am pleased to note that steps are being taken in both directions.
Last month the Conference on Disarmament finally agreed to commence negotiation of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMT). The issues in developing such a treaty are complex and the negotiations are likely to be lengthy but we have to begin to confront these issues head-on. In furtherance of a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/48/75 of 16 December 1993), I wrote to the President of the Conference on Disarmament on 28 August to offer the assistance of the Agency in developing the technical verification arrangements for such a treaty.
You will recall that over the past two years the Agency has been involved in discussions with the Russian Federation and the United States of America to develop the technical, legal and financial arrangements and modalities for possible IAEA verification in the USA and the Russian Federation that nuclear material transferred from the military sector to the peaceful sector, notably fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons, remained peacefully stored or was rendered unusable for weapons purposes. Some progress has been made but many issues still need to be resolved. Minister Adamov of the Russian Federation, Secretary Richardson of the USA and I will meet this week to review progress and set goals for future work.
I also welcome the recent decision of the UK, as a result of its Strategic Defence Review, to be the first nuclear weapon State to declare the total size of its stocks of nuclear material in both the civilian and military sectors. In connection with this Review, the UK has also determined that substantial amounts of fissile material are now surplus to its military programme and that these will be available for IAEA safeguards under the Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement between the UK and the Agency.
The Agency stands ready to contribute its verification and safeguards expertise and experience to the full realization of the prospects for nuclear arms reduction and elimination. An important issue that must be faced urgently, if the Agency is to respond positively to these and other initiatives, is the question of financing. In my view, the establishment of a Nuclear Arms Control Verification Fund based on an agreed scheme of assessed contributions, which could finance the verification of nuclear arms control and reduction measures, is one option which should be given serious consideration. I was asked by the Board of Governors last week to prepare an options paper on the question of financing. I hope that this could speed up the process of agreement on this important matter.
Pursuant to the mandate of the General Conference (resolution GC(41)/RES/25 of 3 October 1997), I have, as stated in my report (GOV/1998/45-GC(42)/15), started consultations which build upon the work of my predecessor with States of the Middle East region to obtain additional and more detailed views on the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region, as well as about the kind of material obligations which might eventually feature in a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) agreement. As has been stated in successive reports on the subject, greater clarity and specificity on the latter issue is important to the preparation of the model verification agreements foreseen in General Conference resolutions.
As my report makes it clear, although commitment to nuclear non-proliferation continues to be voiced by all the parties concerned, views still differ with regard to the modalities and timing of applying full-scope safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region, and to the establishment of an NWFZ in the Middle East.
In the DPRK, the Agency continues to assert its right to perform inspections under the NPT safeguards agreement, which remains in force. At the same time, we are verifying a freeze of the DPRK nuclear programme at the request of the Security Council and reporting periodically to the Council and the Board of Governors.
I regret to have to report that the measure of co-operation which we receive from the DPRK has not increased. Three rounds of technical discussions have taken place since the previous General Conference with no progress noted on any of the outstanding issues associated with eventually assessing the extent of the DPRK's compliance with the safeguards agreement. This includes the preservation of information which must remain available to enable the Agency to verify in the future the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration.
The Agency's inspection and verification activities in Iraq have resulted in the development of a technically coherent picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. However, as with all other Agency verification activities, a degree of uncertainty remains as to the completeness of this picture. Such uncertainty is inherent in any countrywide verification process that seeks to prove the absence of readily concealable objects or activities. Iraq's lack of full transparency with regard to the provision of certain information regarding the few remaining questions relevant to the clandestine programme brings additional uncertainty into the picture.
Nonetheless, this uncertainty does not prevent the full implementation of the IAEA's plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. Indeed, as stated in document GC(42)/14, this uncertainty is factored into the OMV plan, which takes into account the extensive technological expertise developed by Iraq in the course of its clandestine nuclear programme, particularly regarding weaponization and the production of weapon-usable nuclear material.
The Agency continues to focus most of its resources on the implementation and technical strengthening of its OMV plan. As part of its OMV activities, the IAEA will continue to exercise its right to investigate further any aspect of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme through the follow-up of any new information that becomes available.
Since 5 August, Iraq has suspended its co-operation with the IAEA and the UN Special Commission and has provided access only to "declared sites". As a result, the Agency is not able to inspect any new locations or investigate the few remaining questions and concerns regarding Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. Under these circumstances, the IAEA is not able to fully implement its OMV plan - particularly the measures needed to ensure that the past programme will not be revived. Ongoing monitoring and verification constitutes an integral whole and the assurances derived depend on the implementation of all the measures. At present, the level of assurance regarding Iraq's compliance with its obligations is significantly reduced.
On 9 September the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1194 which, among other things, called for Iraq to rescind its decision of 5 August and to co-operate fully with the IAEA and the Special Commission. To date there has been no formal response from Iraq.
I would conclude this review of verification and safeguards priorities by referring to the potential for nuclear weapons proliferation and for threats to public safety from illicit trafficking in nuclear material and other radioactive sources. The Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database Programme has recorded continued incidents of illicit movement of nuclear material and other radioactive sources. In each of the past two years over 30 such incidents were reported. Since last September, there have been 15 incidents involving nuclear material and 20 involving other radioactive sources.
The Secretariat is continuing its activities to assist Member States in their efforts to prevent, detect and respond to theft, diversion and other unauthorized uses of nuclear material and other radioactive sources. The Agency's Security of Material programme covers a wide range of activities including information exchange through, for example, establishing and maintaining the database, and through international conferences, training, technical assistance and other support services. Details of this programme have been provided to Member States in document GC(42)/17. Also, at the request of the United Nations General Assembly, the Agency is continuing to contribute to the ongoing work of the Ad Hoc Committee established by the General Assembly to deal with international terrorism. This Committee is elaborating a draft convention on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism and we must ensure that the new Convention will build upon, and not overlap with, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
The fourth priority area I wish to highlight is the Agency's role in the transfer of technology. Meeting the needs and aspirations of the world's growing population requires the application of the best available technologies. Nuclear techniques - in industry, food and agriculture, water resource and environment management and human health, to name just a few areas - can make an effective contribution to the goal of sustainable development and the improvement of human welfare. Support for nuclear technology transfer for exclusively peaceful purposes is an integral part of the international consensus relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy that is embodied in the IAEA Statute and the NPT. And the IAEA is the principal vehicle for multilateral nuclear technology transfer.
The role of the Agency is to continue to ensure, where nuclear technology remains the most effective and appropriate technology to address a particular problem, that this technology is transferred in the most efficient, effective and safe manner. The size of the Technical Co-operation (TC) programme is modest - approximately $80 million per year - but the impact and results have been outstanding.
The Sterile Insect Technique (SIT) to control pests on an area-wide basis, which was developed in collaboration with the FAO by the Agency's laboratories, is being increasingly applied in developing and developed countries. In Zanzibar, confirmation of a successful Agency project to eradicate the tsetse fly has enabled the Government to launch a five-year programme on improving livestock productivity to meet the national goal for self-sufficiency in milk and meat products. Radioimmunoassay techniques will be used to monitor the effectiveness of the livestock breeding and nutrition programmes. The experience gained with the Zanzibar project is being used in Ethiopia in a SIT programme that will eventually cover the entire Southern Rift Valley. The use of SIT as a biological technique to replace insecticide use is spreading. In the USA, Argentina, Israel, South Africa and Madeira in Portugal, for example, the SIT is being applied to control the fruit fly with lower costs and increased effectiveness.
In the area of human health, in most developed countries over half of all cancer patients receive radiation therapy as part of the management of their disease. But in many developing countries the radiation therapy services are inadequate. The Agency currently supports forty national projects and four major regional projects to upgrade radiation therapy services and has recently assisted the Governments of Ghana, Ethiopia, Mongolia and Namibia to open their first radiation therapy facilities.
As many as 1 in 900 babies in regions with low iodine diets are born with a thyroid deficiency which can lead to severe mental impairment unless detected within the earliest days of life and treated promptly. The Agency has been supporting national and regional screening programmes in more than 20 developing countries, using the simple and cost-effective radioimmunoassay technique. With IAEA assistance, Thailand is expected to screen all of the country's newly born children by the year 2000 for thyroid deficiency. Uruguay has already reached 100 per cent screening coverage and three other Latin American countries are now screening over 85 per cent of their infant population.
Nuclear environmental monitoring techniques have made a major contribution to a regional technical co-operation project in Europe for Marine Environmental Assessment of the Black Sea to determine, inter alia, post-Chernobyl radioactivity levels. The project has established a reliable basis for Black Sea environmental management decisions and the planning of remedial action in co-ordination with other national and regional programmes.
In the field of energy planning, the Agency is assisting Egypt and several countries in East Asia and the Pacific in their strategic planning for electricity generation up to the year 2020. These programs take into consideration all possible options, including renewable energies, and placing special emphasis on the environmental impacts of different options.
In industry the majority of countries with a high industrial base in the East Asia and Pacific region have developed a sustainable programme for training and certification of Non-Destructive Testing Inspectors through a joint project between the Agency and the UNDP.
Through the introduction of a new process for managing co-ordinated research activities and a strategy for technical co-operation which includes Thematic Planning, the Model Project concept, Country Programme Frameworks and concerted efforts to foster partnerships with other international organizations including non-traditional funding organizations, the Agency is aiming for the most effective and efficient measures of delivering its programme of technology transfer and has become an important catalyst to optimize the efforts of others. The confidence of Member States, as manifested through their contributions to the expansion of Agency laboratories and their co-funding of specific programmes or loans to projects, is a testament to the value of the Agency's nuclear applications and technical co-operation programmes. The $8 million loan by the United States Department of Agriculture for the eradication of screw-worm in Jamaica within the next three years is an example of this confidence.
But effective planning for technical co-operation depends on our being able to make sound forward plans on the basis of assured resources from Member States. I express my appreciation to those Member States who have made extra efforts this year to pledge and pay their contributions to the Technical Co-operation Fund (TCF). I would now urge all Member States to pledge their share of the TCF for 1999 in full so that the new biennial programme can start with more predictable and assured resources.
To continue to be able to provide its service with a high level of quality, the Agency maintains two world standard scientific and service laboratories: the Marine Environment Laboratory (MEL) in Monaco and the Seibersdorf Laboratory outside Vienna. In this International Year of the Ocean, I would highlight the unique contribution of MEL to addressing the global issues of marine pollution through its active support of the UN Global Plan of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land Based Activities. In the past year, both the Monaco Laboratory and the Seibersdorf Laboratory have contributed to the marine environmental assessment of the situation following the nuclear testing at Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls. The forthcoming inauguration of the new premises of the Monaco Laboratory, with generous support from the Principality of Monaco and the Government of Japan, will ensure that MEL is equipped to face the challenges of the next century.
Last September I expressed to you my conviction that an international organization can expect to enjoy the support of its members only if it is responsive to their needs and priorities, shows concrete achievements and conducts its activities in a cost effective and transparent manner. Throughout this year I have listened carefully to the views of our Member States on their needs and priorities and their expectations of the Agency. While the emphasis differs, there are clear common themes: increasing demand from our developing Member States for nuclear technology as indispensable to their process of economic and social development; increasing dependence on the Agency as a centre of excellence for international co-operation in nuclear technology; continued concern about nuclear safety, waste and physical protection; increasing reliance on the Agency's verification system for both non-proliferation and nuclear arms reduction purposes; and an urgent need to establish better communication with an increasingly sceptical public that calls for premature closing of safe and efficient power plants in some countries and questions the entire technology in others.
For the Agency the implications are clear: we must check that our programmes do meet the new priorities of our Member States, reach out more effectively to opinion leaders and civil society and achieve greater efficiency wherever possible. To these ends, one of my first actions as Director General was to initiate a comprehensive three level review process covering aspects of the Agency's management and programme.
The first level consists largely of measures to improve efficiency in three areas: policy and co-ordination, programme development and evaluation, and procedures and personnel. In January I convened a Senior Management Conference which led to an Action Plan for better management. Many of the initiatives have been implemented. I am placing particular emphasis on the creation of a 'single Agency' culture to ensure that the Secretariat is clear on its priorities, co-ordinated in its activities and efficient in its processes.
A Programme Co-ordination Committee (PCC) and an Office of Programme Support and Evaluation have been established to ensure the coherence and co-ordination of all Agency programmes. Since its establishment six months ago, the PCC has been tasked to develop measures to ensure integration and synergy between regular, extrabudgetary and technical co-operation programmes. A new Office of Information Management is tasked with rationalizing information processing, and documentation flow and dissemination throughout and beyond the Secretariat.
The programme and budget formulation process is being adjusted to place greater emphasis on expected results rather than just financial details and to facilitate the evaluation of performance. The process for raising and ensuring effective use of extrabudgetary funds is being analysed in the light of the Agency's increasing reliance on this source of funding. A study of the feasibility of a fully biennial Agency programme cycle has been prepared and a report will be submitted soon to Member States for discussion.
Current procedures and processes for the preparation by the Secretariat of reports on its activities have been reviewed and clarified to achieve more concise reporting on programme and financial performance in a reduced number of documents.
Many actions have been initiated in the area of human resource management to ensure that human resources are better matched to programme requirements. A new policy framework for an integrated training programme for 1998 and beyond has been approved, with emphasis on management training. Recruitment procedures have been simplified to expedite the process while preserving the requirement for excellence in the candidates selected.
In parallel with internal management reform I have initiated an external review of the Agency's overall programme by convening a Senior Expert Group to assess priorities and future directions and to present recommendations in October of this year. I expect this programme review to contribute to the Agency's on-going task of identifying, and building consensus on, priorities for the coming years. In consultation with Member States, and drawing on the proposals of the Senior Expert Group and the results of reviews conducted under the Programme Performance Assessment System (PPAS), I intend to prepare an Agency "Medium Term Strategy" (MTS) which will chart the direction of the Agency over the next five years. The Strategy document will set out the Agency's overall objectives and goals. In addition, it will present the programme focus and priorities, taking into account the Agency's internal and external environment as well as the challenges facing the organization.
The importance of public understanding of the role of nuclear energy and of the Agency demands that effective public information be an integral part of the Agency's activities. Therefore the third part of the reform process is the ongoing review of the role and management of public information and the Agency's outreach to civil society, particularly the nuclear, arms control, development communities and the media, using the most modern and effective tools.
The Agency's Internet home page receives over a million 'hits' each month. We are making it more comprehensive, timely and informative. For areas where the Internet is not widely used, we are improving the quality and presentation of printed materials. An improved automated system for more targeted distribution of public information material will be introduced starting at the end of the year. Over the coming months I will be canvassing Member States about their interest in an expanded public information programme, including public seminars on nuclear topics.
The Agency Programme and Budget for 1999-2000 has been formulated after lengthy and intensive consultations with Member States which began more than a year ago with the Key Thrusts for 1999-2000 document and consultations. The total 1999 regular budget is $219,289,000, which is 0.1 per cent lower in real terms than last year. It is of concern that the Agency's role and mandated activities in verification, safety and technology transfer are expanding year by year but the resources available for the regular budget are taking the opposite direction. I am well aware of the impact of the present world economic situation. I am also aware of my responsibility to make best use of the resources made available. However, I should emphasize that the programme budget is a balance between priorities and affordability. In determining what is affordable, I would ask Member States to consider both the short and long term dividends from their investment in the Agency and to focus their sights on the goals to be attained. I trust that this will be a crucial consideration in the decisions of Member States on the future programmes and budgets of the Agency.
The Agency's financial situation continues to be a matter of concern. This situation is primarily the result of two factors. First, as you recall, during 1998 the Agency is required to return some $35 million of cash surpluses related to the period 1992-1995, which has reduced our cash balances and made us very vulnerable to unexpected delays in contributions. Second, up to August of this year receipts had been significantly lower than in the same period last year. As a consequence, we have had to draw in full on the Working Capital Fund and unless we quickly receive pending contributions we may not be able to fully implement the Agency's programme for 1998. I am therefore appealing not only to the largest contributors, but to all Member States who are in arrears or who have not yet paid their 1998 assessed contribution, to make their payments as soon as possible.
In this period of change, uncertainty and opportunity the IAEA should be able to minimize the uncertainties and maximize the opportunities. My commitment as Director General is to ensure that the Agency is fully responsive to the needs of Member States, runs a results oriented programme and conducts operations with maximum efficiency.
Serving the Member States is a two-way process: it requires dialogue and transparency, but it also requires the Member States to support the programmes and budgets they have approved. I have highlighted several areas of particular priority: the need to make further improvements in the safety record of all nuclear activities; the need to take decisions on spent fuel and radioactive waste management; the goal of universality in the conclusion of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocols; and the need for prompt and full payment to the regular budget and the Technical Co-operation Fund.
In short, for the Agency to be able to meet your requirements, we need to work together. To this we are committed and for this we count on your continuing support.