Good afternoon Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am pleased to welcome you to Vienna for the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Commission on Safety Standards (CSS). Through very effective collaboration, the CSS has continued to lead the steady improvement in establishing and revising safety standards and in providing for their use and feedback. Through the good work of the CSS, IAEA Safety Standards are increasingly appreciated worldwide as the basic reference for improving global nuclear safety. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the CSS members for their active participation in strengthening the global nuclear safety and security regime.
Let me also take this opportunity to welcome several new CSS members. Joining the CSS at this meeting are Mr. Peter Johnston from Australia, Mr. Guy Clapisson from South Africa, and Mr. D. Antoni Gurguí Ferrer from Spain. To these new members, I look forward to your participation and contribution to this important Agency activity.
My remarks this morning are intended to help clarify the context for the work to be accomplished by the CSS during this meeting. In particular, I will provide you with perspectives on three global challenges in nuclear safety and security that are influencing current activities and future policies of the international nuclear safety community and the IAEA. I ask that you take into account these perspectives during the course of your deliberations over the next few days.
New and Expanding Nuclear Power Programmes
The first global challenge is to assure safety and prevent serious accidents in new and expanding nuclear power programmes. Today, there is increasingly high interest in new nuclear power programmes and the rapid expansion of existing programmes. Nearly 70 countries are considering or have expressed interest in developing nuclear power programmes. On the other hand, recent projections by the IAEA show that, optimistically, there may be up to 20 new countries using nuclear power by 2030. The low estimate is only 5 new countries by that time. It will be those countries who establish and sustain the necessary safety and security infrastructure that will actually bring nuclear power to fruition. I believe it is very important that these new countries adequately use IAEA safety standards and that they join the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Regime.
While prospective new nuclear programmes receive much attention, the expansion of existing programmes is far more important in terms of the total size of the development. It is expected that future expansion of nuclear power worldwide will depend principally on those 30 countries that already have nuclear power. In terms of installed capacity, what this means is the potential increase from about 370 GWe to about 470 GWe in the low projection or to about 750 GWe in the high projection. This translates roughly into 100 to 300 additional 1000 MW units, which is indeed significant. The expansion of existing nuclear programmes is largely in Asia. Many countries in Europe and North America also expect to expand their nuclear programmes. Developing and further improving safety infrastructure and regulatory framework commensurate with this large size of rapid expansion of nuclear activities is an enormous challenge in front of us.
Against this backdrop, I am particularly concerned by recent statements from some members of industry related to standards for nuclear safety. Specifically, recent correspondence from the World Nuclear Association contained, what I believe to be, typically complacent messages. In particular, it was suggested that (and I quote) "safety standards and licensing processes are congruent with the goal of maximizing the economic and procedural efficiency by which nuclear power is able... to make its clean-energy contribution." (end quote). The commitment to safety cannot afford to be blurred at this critical time in the development and use of nuclear technologies throughout the world, especially in light of the complexities faced by nuclear operators and regulators from the multinational nature of today′s nuclear business and activities. I believe the CSS can play an important role in communicating to the international nuclear community that safety is an essential enabler of nuclear technologies rather than a burden or hindrance and that the prime responsibility for safety, which cannot be outsourced, is with the operator and national government.
The IAEA is very committed to adapting and continuously improving its existing standards, guidelines and services to better meet the needs of its Member States and appreciate the CSS support for this commitment, in particular for the Member States rapidly introducing or expanding nuclear power. For this purpose, the CSS should continue to consider ways to further facilitate the processes for establishing and applying Safety Standards. On a related matter, draft safety guide, DS424, entitled Establishing a Safety Infrastructure for a National Nuclear Power Programme, has been sent to the Committees for their review. It is important that this safety guide be approved and made available for use by Member States in a timely manner. The CSS should also consider how the key elements of the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Regime should adapt to new entrants in a synergistic manner. For example, we should ask ourselves "how can we improve the way safety standards and security guidance are used in harmony with international legal instruments and peer reviews?"
Safety and Security Synergy and Integration
The second global challenge is the synergy between safety and security, and the integration where appropriate. At the twenty-fourth CSS meeting, you discussed the synergy and integration between safety and security, with particular consideration of the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles, stating that safety measures and security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner so that security measures do not compromise safety and vice versa. This matter is one that will indeed require further deliberation by the international nuclear community. In fact, safety and security synergy and integration was discussed in detail during the meeting of the International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG) two weeks ago, where the draft document INSAG-24 on the relationship between safety and security was discussed. This subject was also considered in depth at the International Symposium on Nuclear Security at the beginning of this month, where strong support for an integrated approach was expressed by the many participants including the Chairman of the Advisory Group on Nuclear Security (AdSec).
At this meeting of the CSS you will also consider this matter further. Moreover, I should note that this is the first occasion whereby a joint session between the CSS and AdSec will be conducted tomorrow. I think this occasion highlights the importance of the issue. I believe that the CSS can contribute its broad knowledge and experience to help the international community move forward in a deliberate and effective manner. For this purpose, the CSS will be considering the related INSAG draft report, INSAG-24, and the secretariat′s report on the integration and synergy between the Safety Standards Series and Nuclear Security Series documents.
Stakeholder Involvement
The third global issue is stakeholder involvement in nuclear safety activities. The international nuclear community has made steady progress towards improving the openness and transparency of its activities to its stakeholders, and without question, political and public support for nuclear technologies demands that we continue to be open and transparent about our activities in nuclear safety. However, this does pose a challenge for us in the area of nuclear security where there is an important need to protect sensitive information from people and organizations with malevolent intent.
The IAEA also believes in maximizing, to the extent practicable, the openness and transparency of its activities to improve global nuclear safety and security performance, as well as public confidence. As such, an important item during this CSS meeting is the discussion on stakeholder involvement in the preparation of safety standards. As you know, there are organizations that are permitted to observe CSS activities and there are a variety of international and non-governmental organizations that have an interest in observing CSS activities. The challenge for us is to establish an effective process for designating such observers. Furthermore, a challenge for the CSS is to avoid its Committees from becoming the lobbying grounds for individual agendas.
Concluding Remarks
I hope that my opening remarks have provided you with some context and considerations for your work during this meeting. The international nuclear community is faced with many issues and challenges, among which are new and expanding nuclear power programmes, synergy and integration between safety and security, and stakeholder involvement. The CSS plays a vitally important role in the IAEA′s efforts to establish high-quality standards of safety and to provide for their use.
In looking forward, I believe that the international nuclear community should take concrete actions to coordinate and support the promotion of the use of safety standards, particularly in light of new countries joining the Global Nuclear Safety and Security Regime. In addition to the activities of the CSS, opportunities such as the Senior Regulators′ Meeting and the forthcoming International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems in South Africa this December can also serve this purpose.
I thank you for your attention.