I am pleased to address this seminar organized by the Nuclear Suppliers Group as a contribution to better understanding of the role of the group and of its guidelines. I shall try to describe the setting in which export controls are placed - the main elements of international efforts to stem the further spread of nuclear weapons. Naturally I shall focus on the role of international verification - which is the special responsibility of the IAEA.
Let me say at the outset that I am optimistic about the outlook for non-proliferation. The incentive to acquire nuclear weapons is in large measure - though perhaps not exclusively - linked to how States perceive their security situation. If security is seen as a lessening problem, as is the case in most regions of the world, then the incentive to move to nuclear weapons is diminished. If, further, there is a general movement away from nuclear weapons, as is slowly the case in nuclear-weapon States, this movement, too, will reduce the incentive. In the areas where we presently see the greatest risk of further proliferation, the front line efforts to impede it will, in my view, need to be in the areas of foreign policy, security policy and economic policy - aiming particularly at building trust and detente. But international verification is also a vital element - it can act as a confidence building measure contributing to the creation of trust and subsequently help maintain that trust. It should also sound the warning when the basis for trust is threatened. Export controls and restrictions are yet another means of reducing the risk of further proliferation.
The Non Proliferation Regime
The array of measures designed to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons is often referred to as the "non-proliferation regime". The expression, in my view, is a bit of a deliberate overstatement. The word "regime" to me means a legally binding order. Some of the measures in this regime are, indeed, legally binding agreements, but they are binding only for the parties to them. Other measures may not be of a legal character. The regime consists of a network of global, regional and bilateral agreements in which States commit themselves not to manufacture or possess nuclear weapons - the Non Proliferation Treaty with over 180 adherents being the central pillar. The respect for these commitments is verified by the system of international safeguards - and performing those inspections is one of the IAEA's principal responsibilities.
The guidelines established by suppliers of nuclear and nuclear-related materials, technology and equipment to regulate the trade in these items is a further element of the regime. Yet another component is the measures taken by countries to ensure the "physical protection" of nuclear material and facilities - that is, the barriers erected to prevent illegal access to or use of nuclear items by individuals or groups. Such physical protection measures are the responsibility of individual countries. However, the international convention on physical protection establishes amongst other things rules for the protection of nuclear material which is being moved from one country to another. The IAEA has established guidelines on measures to be adopted for the domestic protection of such material. In a wider definition, yet other measures might be included in the concept of a non-proliferation regime: negative and positive security assurances against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons and other nuclear arms control accords and the Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Test Ban Treaty.
From the beginning of the nuclear era export controls and export restrictions have been seen as indispensible. Indeed the earliest attempts to arrest the further spread of nuclear weapons were based on policies of denying access to nuclear materials. By the 1950s it was apparent that simple denial would not work. A system had to be devised that made it possible to exploit the potential benefits of nuclear energy while ensuring that its use was exclusively peaceful. This realization was the basis for the Atoms for Peace policy and the creation, forty years ago, of the IAEA. The policies of denial gave way to systems for controlled exports. The manner in which States exercised this control over the export of nuclear items and the extent of the control was for a long time a matter of heated debate - including in the IAEA where for many years a special committee of the Board - the Committee on Assurance of Supply - deliberated on the matter. It should also be noted that the level of caution exercised regarding exports has risen much over time. Comprehensive safeguards were not required as a condition for export in the early days. And while the NPT does not prohibit the export of reprocessing or enrichment plants, non-proliferation concerns today would rule out practically all such export.
Today it would seem that while concerns and criticism still persist that some restrictions may amount to a denial of technology, there is a considerably greater area of common understanding of the need for systems of export control. Evidence of this growing understanding has been the steady increase in membership of mechanisms such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The recent announcement by China regarding the strengthening of controls on its nuclear exports is further evidence. There has also been a widening recognition that policies of export restrictions are not a matter only for this or that group of suppliers and that there is a need for greater transparency as called for by the "Principles and Objectives" document of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Your seminar and the broad participation in it perhaps also testifies to this. I don't think we have come so far that we could try to develop a consensus on export controls in the IAEA, but there is more understanding - especially after the realization how much Iraq was able to import toward its programme of enrichment of uranium.
The Proliferation Outlook
I mentioned that I am optimistic about the prospects for non-proliferation. Let me spend a few minutes telling you why.
The continued relaxation of tensions in international relations is facilitating tangible progress in the area of nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. The projected cutting of American and Russian arsenals by two thirds under the START treaties, the agreement by more than 140 States on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the expected but delayed negotiation of an agreement to cut off production of fissile material for weapons purposes are vital steps towards further reducing the threat of nuclear weapons, and of limiting their spread.
In recent years, a number of major developments have taken place with respect to States' legal undertakings not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons and to accept IAEA safeguards on existing and future nuclear activities. Let me mention some examples in this regard:
International Verification
While there are thus many reasons for satisfaction, I should also note, however, that in two cases specific and unambiguous commitments to nuclear non-proliferation have proved illusory. In the wake of the Gulf War it was discovered that Iraq, a party to the NPT and a comprehensive safeguards agreement, had violated its obligation by actively pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. After more than six years of the most extensive and intrusive inspection regime and the discovery, mapping and destruction of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme, questions still remain, showing the difficulty of positively proving the absence of relevant nuclear material and equipment. In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), also a party to the NPT, Agency inspection pointed to inaccuracies in information, suggesting that the DPRK had produced more plutonium than it had declared to our inspectors. Despite various international efforts the DPRK remains in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and the DPRK's initial declaration of its nuclear material cannot be verified. Indeed, we have not even got DPRK's agreement to preserve evidence which may be required later to verify the initial declaration.
It is evident that any verification system will need to evolve over time - to meet changing demands and to take advantage of advances in verification technologies - and the Agency's safeguards system had indeed been evolving. However, the shock discoveries in Iraq required more than an incremental response. It led to a fundamental review of the safeguards system and the systematic introduction over the last six years of new strengthening measures - involving greater access for Agency inspectors to information and locations and the wider use of new techniques such as environmental sampling. It has also led to rethinking of other elements of the non-proliferation regime, not least the systems of export controls.
The main issue addressed in the review of the safeguards system after Iraq was the ability of Agency verification activities to detect undeclared nuclear activities. Hitherto the safeguards system had been largely based on nuclear material accountancy - analogous to a financial accounting system with the Agency playing the role of auditor. The "classical" safeguards system focused on the correctness of information provided by the State and not to the completeness of that information. This is precisely the problem.
When a State accedes to the NPT or assumes a comparable non-proliferation undertaking, and provides the IAEA with an "initial report" describing its nuclear material and facilities, as required by the relevant safeguards agreement, how can the IAEA be confident that the initial report is complete? Even a detailed investigation may not produce the relevant results when historical records are incomplete or other information substantiating the initial report is not available. This is a difficult problem, particularly when a State has a sizeable nuclear programme and could have produced unsafeguarded weapon-usable material prior to entering into a non-proliferation commitment and accepting comprehensive safeguards. Moreover, even if initial reports are complete there remains the possibility, as occurred in Iraq, that a State might subsequently build secret facilities or secretly produce nuclear material. The main thrust of the changes introduced in the safeguards system has been to give the Agency improved tools for assessing the completeness of the coverage of safeguards, thereby allowing us to gain greater assurance that all nuclear activities - not just the ones we are shown - are indeed peaceful.
One of the first measures undertaken to bolster the ability of the Agency to examine the possible existence of nuclear material which should have been declared, was the explicit assertion and confirmation - even before the revelations in Iraq - of the right of the Agency to perform special inspections.
If before 1991 the Agency had systematically monitored media, it might have seen some smoke coming from Iraq. After the revelations the Agency began systematically to scan media for proliferation cues. Another measure taken early after the Iraq revelation was to demand early information about installations in which nuclear material was to be inserted.
Other measures which have been introduced under the legal authority provided by current safeguards agreements include the collection and analysis of information on a so far unprecedented scale and an environmental sampling programme permitting the Agency to note the absence, or detect the presence of, undeclared nuclear activities.
Further, as we all know, the Agency's Board of Governors adopted, in May 1997, a Model Protocol additional to Safeguards Agreements which will - when accepted by States - provide the Agency with complementary legal authority to implement a number of new safeguards measures. It is gratifying, that, in addition to States with comprehensive safeguards obligations, the five nuclear-weapon States have expressed their intention to apply those measures provided for in the Model Protocol that each of them identifies as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol and as consistent with their obligations under the NPT. Such application is seen as equitable by many non-nuclear-weapon States. It is also hoped that States not parties to comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency will implement, to the extent they are able to do so, measures contained in the Protocol.
Since its adoption by the Board of Governors, six States - Armenia, Australia, Georgia, Philippines, Poland and Uruguay have signed the Additional Protocol. Two of them, Armenia and Georgia, undertook the commitment to apply the Protocol provisionally, pending its ratification. The outlook for early broad acceptance is good: the EU, Japan, Canada and others have signalled that they are moving towards early acceptance.
Strengthened Safeguards
Let me outline now the new measures which have been, are being or will be introduced.
First is the group of measures to strengthen the Agency's access to information. Measures taken in this area in recent years include early provision of design information on declared facilities (in order to provide the Agency with the earliest possible warning of a new facility coming under safeguards), greater use of data on nuclear activities that are available in-house or in the public domain, improved analysis and evaluation of all relevant information available to the Agency, use of environmental sampling and a voluntary reporting scheme on the export and import of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, and specified equipment. The latter scheme provides the Agency with additional information regarding the movements of nuclear material and activities that involve the processing of material.
Under the Additional Protocol, many of these measures are codified and made obligatory - resulting in the Agency having access to a broader range of information on a State's nuclear activities and thereby creating greater transparency.
A second group of measures relate to increased physical access to sites and to the effectiveness of that access. As I have already noted, one early step was the IAEA Board's reaffirmation of the Agency's right to carry out special inspections. A second component is the voluntary offers made by some governments to accept Agency visits "any time, any place".
The Additional Protocol provides, inter alia, for:
- unrestricted access for Agency inspectors to locations on nuclear sites and other locations in the State where nuclear material is indicated to be present;
- access beyond nuclear sites, arranged on a case-by-case basis, in order to follow up on information or to implement technical measures such as the collection of environmental samples.
A third group of measures are directed at rationalization and administrative streamlining of the safeguards system. Measures already taken include the expanded use of the IAEA's two regional safeguards offices in Toronto and Tokyo, the New Partnership Approach agreement with the Euratom Inspectorate, the implementation by a large number of States of simplified designation procedures for inspectors, and greater use of unattended measurement and surveillance equipment with remote transmission of data, in lieu of some inspections.
Further measures which are being implemented or contemplated pursuant to Additional Protocols to safeguards agreements include:
- expanded capability for inspectors to communicate with headquarters;
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- expanded joint use of equipment and laboratories by the IAEA and State Systems of Accountancy for and Control (SSAC) of nuclear materials.
The test of these new measures will be that they enhance the effectiveness of the system and be cost-effective. Experience gained in extensive trials in the implementation of the new measures suggests that they can be implemented without much additional intrusion or cost to the States involved. The Agency recognizes, however, the potential sensitivity associated with the implementation of the new measures. It has recently embarked upon a process of updating its confidentiality regime to ensure effective protection against disclosure of commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge. It is also embarking on a series of consultations with States on the practicalities of implementation.
Cost-effectiveness is another important issue. It cannot be considered in isolation from a matter of no less importance, namely what degree of assurance the system is to provide. A technical system to verify that something is not existing or happening on a State-wide basis cannot achieve a 100% assurance. The Agency's task must be rather to provide a suitably high level of assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. However, "no diversion" and "no undeclared nuclear activities" are negatives that cannot be detected. They can only be inferred by the absence of evidence to the contrary. There is a close interrelationship between the amount and quality of information and access provided to the Agency on the one hand and the level of assurance that can be gained from an absence of findings on the other. A comparison of the cases of South Africa - where the Agency enjoyed close co-operation and a high degree of access to relevant data - with that of Iraq, illustrates what I mean.
Export Controls and the Non-Proliferation Regime
Let me now return to the role of export controls in the non-proliferation regime from the Agency's perspective. As I mentioned earlier, export control is an important component in the efforts to prevent further nuclear proliferation. This was underlined in the consensus statement of 31 January 1992 by the United Nations Security Council in which the Council, inter alia, underlined the "the importance of effective export controls".
The operation of any system of nuclear verification presupposes the ability to track the physical whereabouts of items of interest - including when they are exported and when imported. Thus safeguards agreements contain provisions for reporting on international transfers of nuclear material and can cover other relevant items. Expanded reporting requirements are now being put in place. More extensive reporting - for example to cover nuclear source material intended for non-nuclear uses - will help provide a fuller picture of a country's nuclear activities. As we have observed in the case of Iraq, States without substantial indigenous supplies can, through imports, accumulate large inventories of nuclear source material to support a clandestine programme. Moreover, information on the exports and imports of items other than nuclear material - namely, equipment and non-nuclear material commonly used in the nuclear industry - was, in the past, only required by the specific provisions of INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type safeguards agreements - that is, the agreements used for safeguarding specific facilities or material but where the State has not accepted comprehensive safeguards pursuant to non-proliferation commitments. The new strengthened safeguards provisions now cover these items.
In the period immediately after the Gulf War the Board of Governors sought to close this gap by adopting a voluntary scheme for reporting on transfers of nuclear material, and specified equipment and non-nuclear material. The scheme has now been operating for more than five years. It currently comprises 52 Agency Member States, including most major nuclear supplier States, as well as Euratom. Information obtained through the scheme provides additional transparency in international nuclear trade, and helps the Agency gain a more complete understanding of all nuclear activities in a State.
However, the scheme has limitations - it is voluntary and not all States participate. The recognition of the need to provide the Agency with more comprehensive information on States' exports and imports of all nuclear material in peaceful activities and with information about exports and imports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material especially designed and prepared for nuclear uses was reflected in the recent negotiations of the Model Additional Protocol. States parties to the Additional Protocol will have a legal obligation to provide the Agency with information on exports and confirmation of imports of such materials. By adopting the Model Additional Protocol and its Annexes, the Agency has established its own list of specified equipment and non-nuclear material for the reporting of exports and imports which will be updated as and when required by the Agency. Needless to say this provision of the Protocol will oblige States to have a mechanism for import and export control - if only to know what items are entering or leaving the country.
In comparing the information required by the Agency under the Protocol and the trigger lists elaborated by the NSG it will noted that Agency does not require information about dual-use items. However, there is no doubt that greater transparency and increased co-operation among the suppliers and importers of such items will also be helpful from the perspective of the overall level of confidence in the conclusions of safeguards verification.
While the aims of international verification and the work on nuclear supplier guidelines have the same end goal - the prevention of proliferation - and a high degree of complementarity, it should also be observed that there are differences in the way the information is to be used. A State for example may ultimately exercise its power to deny permission to export: that is, to act directly to prevent a development of concern. This power is not directly available to the Agency - nor has it been suggested it should. Observation by the Agency of a State's import of various items help us to do our specific job - that of verifying observance of commitments made. Such observation may lead the Agency to a suspicion which it might confirm through other measures, including inspection, that the State is seeking to violate non-proliferation commitments. But the Agency's role is not one of a policeman directly able to intervene. Rather its role is that of the watchdog, alert and where necessary prepared to report to the Security Council in the event of evidence of a violation.
Concluding Remarks
The revelations of recent years of breaches to non-proliferation undertakings have been quickly acted on by the international community. The system of international safeguards has been changed and, once the provisions of the Additional Protocol are accepted by States, the assurance provided will be greatly enhanced. Other elements of the non-proliferation regime have also been upgraded, not least the NSG of which you will hear more from the experts in the course of this seminar. Also, it will be noted that the various elements of the non-proliferation regime have their respective roles and should complement each other - this they are doing. There are also areas of overlap and redundancy between the various elements - which is not surprising and indeed desirable in such a sensitive area of international security and where no one mechanism is able to provide unequivocal assurance.
As we have seen in the case of Iraq, it was possible for a country to evade the safeguards system in force at that time. It was also able to acquire a vast assortment of equipment as well as raw materials for a weapon programme - despite the supplier controls then applying. Finally, it appears to have escaped detection by the various national intelligence capabilities. While efforts are clearly being made to remedy apparent shortcomings, it is equally clear that 100% assurance can never be achieved by any one of the measures I mentioned. It must be admitted that even when all systems are brought to bear, there is still a possibility that illegal activities could go undetected. And it is to be noted that while most scenarios assume State complicity in any such clandestine activity, the incidents of illegal trafficking in nuclear items remind us of the further - though rather remote - possibility of proscribed activities by sub-national groups. It is perhaps these persistent concerns that encourage thought of counter-proliferation by enhanced national detection capacity and defensive and/or offensive military capabilities directed at suspected proliferators.
I will not pass judgement on the merits of investment in such further layers of assurance - but I think it is also unlikely that such systems would be able to deliver 100% assurance. I would rather hazard that the relatively small costs of multilateral verification systems represent a very cost-effective investment. Further investments in such systems might give more dividends than some billion dollar alternatives. You get what you pay for ....