Mr. President, Dear Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen,
On behalf of the IAEA, I would like to congratulate you on a successful conference. Nearly 200 participants from about 41 countries and organizations from a variety of experienced nuclear communities have provided us with useful lessons and strategic ideas.
First of all I would stress that the conference marks a major shift for international cooperation in the management of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors. Three years ago, spent fuel management was seen as a technical matter related mainly to transport and storage technology. However, as underlined by the title of the first session on Monday, the evolving international scene has made the spent fuel management one of the important focuses in the growing high expectation for the future generation of nuclear energy in the world.
To support countries to meet future energy demand and to develop a peaceful, safe and secure nuclear industry worldwide, relevant examples, important international initiatives and clear national strategy are already in place. A comprehensive and flexible policy approach is the need of the hour for spent fuel management and rigid dichotomy of the past between resource and waste or storage and disposal should be avoided. To support countries to meet future energy demand and to develop a peaceful, safe and secure nuclear industry worldwide, important initiatives such as the US and the Russian ones are already in place.
However, as stressed in particular by Bruno Pellaud, any international initiative, any multi-national approach needs time-tested and proven technology as well as a harmonized safety context before it is developed. He clearly suggested that the IAEA should have a role if there is to be any development in this context. The challenge for the Agency in this context is how to assist Member States in materializing these initiatives in an effective, constructive, practical and equitable manner for the common interest of all Member States.
The bases for an international nuclear safety regime were discussed during the conference. In particular, the nature and the membership of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management were discussed.
Is the incentive nature of the Joint Convention sufficient to maintain a high level of safety in Spent Fuel management? Do we need a more effective international framework with firm requirements and reassurance of compliance with a nuclear safety regime? Do we need more rigors in the reporting process? According to the president of the second review meeting, the Contracting Parties of the Joint Convention are not yet ready to go into that direction. However, listening to your debate, I conclude that the IAEA could work on this subject and report its conclusions to the Contracting Parties for consideration.
Increasing the membership of the Joint Convention is also an issue which needs attention. It is one of the conclusions of the second review meeting and it has also emerged from your conference. The IAEA has already prepared an action plan to explain and to convince its Member States of the needs and advantages of ratifying the Joint Convention.
The IAEA Safety Standards complement the international safety conventions in the establishment of a global nuclear safety regime. They are developed and applied in different ways by and for the IAEA Member States and they are recognized by several other international organizations. They serve as the solid basis for the self assessment of national programmes or for organizing international appraisals. The series of the Safety Standards is now mature with the finalization of the unified fundamental principles. However, it is clear from the conference that the series needs to be completed by more guidance in spent fuel management such as storage or criticality.
The worldwide application of the IAEA Transport Standards is a good example for providing an effective framework that contributes to harmonised international regulatory infrastructure.
The conference highlighted the trends in spent fuel management that can impact transport safety for example higher discharge burn up and long term storage.
Although discussion was limited, Security and Protection against terrorism is another important area after September 11, 2001, in all areas of spent fuel management including transport.
From the discussions of the conference on the subject of spent fuel storage it is clear that, while there is confidence in the reliability of currently operating storage systems from a wide range of long historical experience, there is less certainty about the storage of spent fuel for periods. This is especially true of stored MOX and alloy fuels, and fuels with high burn-up, for which less data exists on time dependent behaviour. This is an area where more research and development is needed in order to provide the necessary confidence to allow such stores to be licensed for long periods into the future. The IAEA has already some work in hand aimed at helping Member States examine and resolve this problem and I think that the results of this conference will give an impetus for enhanced efforts in this area. The IAEA’s safety standards are also deficient in this area and need to be strengthened to support national regulators in licensing spent fuel stores for extended periods into the future.
The subject of burn-up credit has been addressed in several IAEA meetings and publications in the past. It is an important approach by which some of the problems of space shortage in reactor pools and in other stores can be alleviated. The discussions at the conference have indicated that, while good information exists on PWR and BWR fuels to allow allowance to be taken of burn-up credit, the same information is deficient for other types of reactor fuel, for example, WWER and RBMK fuels. It was suggested that the IAEA might be able to facilitate the transfer of this information if it exists, or to encourage research to obtain it. This is certainly something that the IAEA can consider. In the same way as for long term storage there is also a regulatory side to this subject and I think the IAEA should give consideration to the licensing of storage systems that use burn-up credit and to review its safety standards in this context to ensure that appropriate guidance is given to regulators. The work of the Conference also highlighted the need for "reprocessing and recycling plutonium and minor actinides in fast reactors" for efficient utilization of uranium raw material and for minimizing decay heat, waste volume and radiotoxicity of waste for final disposal. In this area, there is a need for international cooperation to upgrade the technology and to make it efficient, safe, secure and proliferation-resistant. The INPRO Joint Study on "fast reactors and closed fuel cycle" is a typical example of such co-operation.
The last but not the least, I would like to express my sincere thanks to all people who supported successful planning and implementation of this Conference.
In particular, excellent leadership by the President and session chairs, and coordinated preparation by the programme committee are undoubtedly behind the success and they deserve great appreciation.
Finally, I hope that you have found the presentations, discussions and the exchange of information at this conference useful and that it has contributed in some way towards helping you in your work on this subject. I wish you a safe return to your home countries. I now declare this Conference officially closed.
Thank you.