Development of Methodology for Risk Assessment and State Management of Nuclear Security Regime

In order to enable Member State to evaluate effectiveness of State nuclear security regime and select most optimal new nuclear security measures, a new CRP on Development of Methodology for Risk Assessment and State Management of the Nuclear Security Regime is proposed.
There is obvious need for many States to have the internationally agreed and tested methodology for risk assessment of adversary activities and for evaluation of effectiveness of State nuclear security measures. Depending on the scale of nuclear activities in a State, these assessments and evaluations could require special expertise and experience, which might not be immediately available in the States.
The developed and tested methodology should help the States to identify the components and technologies in a State nuclear related infrastructure, which could be used by the adversaries for completion of the main adversary’s threats (acquisition of Nuclear Material (NM) and fabrication of Improvised Nuclear Explosive Device (IND); sabotage of nuclear facility or transport; dispersion of or exposure to radioactive material (RDD or RED)). It should also help to develop optimal nuclear security measures and manage the comprehensive State security regime, which would include, along with physical protection of the facilities, the other technical and administrative measures.
The CRP activities would be part of the Agency’s programme on Nuclear Security (Programme 3.5)