The Safeguards Statement for 1998 indicates that, with the exception of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), where the Agency has still not been able to verify the completeness and correctness of its initial declaration of nuclear material, the Secretariat did not find any indication of diversion or misuse of nuclear material, facilities or equipment placed under safeguards.
As more Additional Protocols enter into force and the Secretariat's safeguards implementation activities expand accordingly, the Secretariat will be able to provide greater assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities.
An additional remark on safeguards inspections. Normally the Secretariat does not provide information on specific inspections, but in light of press reports during recent weeks, I would like to confirm that the Secretariat performed a safeguards inspection at the Vinca nuclear research institute near Belgrade last week. The Inspection Team carried out all planned inspection activities and can confirm, subject to completion of its analysis, that it did not find any indication that the status of the nuclear material at the facility had changed.
There have been no positive developments with respect to any of the long outstanding issues regarding the DPRK since my last report to the March Board. Meanwhile, the Agency continues to maintain the permanent presence of two inspectors there.
With regard to Iraq, it is now nearly six months since the Agency has been able to carry out inspections in connection with its mandate under Security Council resolutions. As a result, it is unable to give any measure of assurance about Iraq's compliance with its obligations under those resolutions. The longer the Agency remains unable to perform its verification mandate in Iraq, the more difficult it will be to re-establish its knowledge of Iraq's nuclear related assets. It is thus important that the Agency resume verification activities in Iraq without delay.
The conclusion of safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols continues to be a high priority for the Secretariat. However, it should be noted that despite the Agency's constant reminders, some 39 States have not yet complied with legal obligations to conclude a safeguards agreement under the relevant treaty to which they are a party.
If the Board approves the Additional Protocol with Romania now before it, Protocols for a total of 41 States will have been approved to date. Since the March Board meeting, the Secretariat has held discussions and consultations with a number of countries, including Azerbaijan, Ecuador, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, Switzerland and South Africa. Late last week I was informed that Cuba is now ready to sign a Protocol additional to its safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/66). I hope that all countries which have not yet done so will conclude an Additional Protocol soon, primarily the remaining 30 countries with comprehensive safeguards agreements operating nuclear facilities. The Secretariat will continue to use all available forums to bring home the relevance and importance of the conclusion of safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols. In this connection, the Secretariat recently made a presentation at the third Preparatory Committee meeting of NPT States Parties in New York.
Turning now to other matters, I note that the first Review Meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety was held here in Vienna from 12 to 23 April. The Contracting Parties concluded that the review process had proven to be valuable to their national nuclear safety programmes. In my remarks to the meeting, I emphasized three points: the importance of universal adherence to conventions and other safety related international instruments; the need for transparency in the safety field, which would be promoted inter alia by full use of the Agency's safety services; and the importance of technical co-operation and assistance by donor countries for those States who need it.
Twenty-nine weeks separate us from the beginning of the new millennium. Last November, I presented to the Board the Agency's Y2K action plan to address potential difficulties in its operations and possible assistance to Member States. The action plan also described the Agency's role, as requested by the General Conference, as a clearing-house and central point of contact for Member States to exchange information on diagnostic and remedial actions at nuclear power plants, and fuel cycle and medical facilities to make them Y2K compliant...
Over the next month, three more workshops for information exchange on different types of facilities are being organized. It is important that all Member States participate actively in these workshops. I also encourage Member States to make use of the Agency's Web pages and participate in the on-line discussion forum that has been set up...
With regard to the Agency's own operations, all information technology infrastructure and information system applications, including those in the area of safeguards, are expected to be Y2K compliant by October.