Introduction
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the international community’s highest priorities. Central to the success of that endeavour is the verification role performed by the IAEA within the legal framework provided by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – or NPT. Under the terms of that Treaty, non-nuclear weapon States are required to sign a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Our job is to check that these States are living up to their obligations. In other words, to ensure that all nuclear material in these States remains in peaceful activities and that all nuclear-related activities are solely for peaceful purposes.
Today, I want to set out what I regard as the major challenges currently facing the Department of Safeguards and then outline how we are attempting to meet those challenges going forward.
Context
But first it is important to describe the present context within which we are operating – globally, technologically and institutionally.
Currently, the IAEA - the Agency - is implementing safeguards for 180 States with safeguards agreements in force, with about 180,000 significant quantities of nuclear material in some 1,300 facilities. We receive more than 700,000 nuclear material accounting reports annually and carry out about 2,000 inspections on the ground. We have more than 20,000 seals and over 1,000 attended and unattended monitoring and measuring systems in the field. Each year we analyse more than 900 samples and over 400 satellite images each year, and prepare about 3,000 analysis and evaluation reports.
Around the world today – even in in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident - there is growing interest in nuclear energy, both for electricity generation and other applications. For instance, the number of nuclear power reactors in operation throughout the world stands at 435. Seventy-three reactors are under construction. Many older plants are being modernized and becoming more technologically sophisticated. International nuclear cooperation between States is intensifying – with an expansion of trade in nuclear and related equipment, items and materials. With nuclear expansion, many additional nuclear activities and facilities are being brought under safeguards.
Of greater concern is the prospect of certain nuclear activities, such as enrichment and reprocessing, becoming more widespread. Meanwhile, growing global trade and the erosion of borders makes it easier for the covert supply of nuclear and related technology to interested parties; and the Internet facilitates the uncontrolled spread of sensitive nuclear know-how. To sum up: demands on Agency safeguards are growing and becoming more complex.
Meanwhile, and this brings me to my second point, the Agency’s?obligations?and those of States through their safeguards agreements, remain the same. These obligations involved are a fixed factor in this equation, and cannot be relaxed – whether to save money or for any other reason.
In parallel, for the foreseeable future at least, the Agency’s budget will not rise. Indeed it has been static for some time already. In these times of austerity and rising demand for our services, a more strategic targeting of resources is animperative, not just good sense. The Agency depends on the financial contributions of its Member States, many of which are under pressure to reduce public expenditure.? We have to spend every Euro wisely. Everything we do has an opportunity cost: just as we cannot afford to weaken safeguards, nor can we afford to waste money on unnecessary activity. So, we need to better focus safeguards implementation on areas of greater safeguards significance, apply our resources more thoughtfully, deploy more flexible work practices and exploit new technological solutions.?
I would also make the point that the Agency’s efforts in dealing with problem cases – most obviously, at present – Iran – requires a major concentration of resources and capability. There is a sizeable cost involved - in terms of personnel, effort and resource.
Nor should we forget the?historical?context, which still has a strong bearing on how we work today…
I need hardly remind this audience how twenty years ago Iraq demonstrated how a determined proliferator was able to pursue a clandestine nuclear weapons programme despite having a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force. This situation obviously undermined the credibility of the IAEA’s safeguards system and triggered efforts to strengthen it. One of the main outcomes of this was the Model Additional Protocol, which provides the Agency with increased access to locations and information regarding the State’s nuclear activities. However, becoming a party to the additional protocol is voluntary. So, although the 122 States that have one in force today contain the vast majority of States with large nuclear programmes, a small number of such States still remain outside its legal framework. This is important because without an additional protocol to complement a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the Agency is unable to conclude that?all?nuclear material remains in peaceful activities.
A major?political?challenge, therefore, is to achieve universality in adherence to the additional protocol.
Also on the plus side, technological developments are helping us to become more effective and efficient. Over the past twenty years or so we have begun to exploit newly available technologies as they become available, such as environmental sampling; to employ satellite imagery more extensively; and generally to gather, analyse and evaluate a wider range of safeguards-relevant information.? ?
In doing so, it is essential that we retain the trust of our Member States by explaining in an open and transparent manner what we are doing. We must also preserve our credibility by exercising our authority robustly and with impartiality. If we back down in cases of suspected or actual non-compliance, our authority will be lost and our ability to deter and prevent proliferation will be diminished. In this context, the Director General has adopted a clear and consistent line.
The Hard Cases
This leads me to how we deal with the handful of States with which we have encountered serious issues of non-compliance.
Problems with the?DPRK?date back to 1992 when the Agency was unable to verify the correctness and completeness of that country’s initial report on its ‘nuclear material subject to safeguards’.? The DPRK withdrew from the NPT and subsequently conducted underground nuclear tests. Agency inspectors were never able to verify the DPRK’s nuclear programme comprehensively before being ejected from the country in 2009 - and they haven’t returned since. Our knowledge of the nuclear programme in the DPRK is, therefore, very limited. There is little we can do unless and until the DPRK invites us back in.?
In?Syria, the existence of what was very likely to have been a nuclear reactor which should have been declared to the Agency, only came to light after its destruction in 2007. Syria claims that the destroyed building was not a nuclear reactor and the matter remains unresolved. It is essential that Syria cooperates, answers our questions and provides access to locations, people and information. Unfortunately, the current security situation inside Syria does not allow us to conduct our?regular?verification activities, even less to pursue the outstanding questions in relation to the destroyed reactor.
Iran -?For the past two years the Agency has tried to engage Iran to ensure international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme - initially, without success. However, the advent of a new government in Tehran has coincided with a more open and cooperative approach. This has resulted in the Agency and Iran signing a new Framework for Cooperation, by which both parties will cooperate further to “resolve all present and past issues” on a step?by-step basis. During the first stage of this process, Iran will implement a series of six practical measures over the next three months. These “transparency” measures involve Iran providing the Agency with more information about planned nuclear facilities and activities in Iran, and with access to the Gchine uranium mine in Bandar Abbas and the Heavy Water Production Plant at Arak. The Director General has described the Framework for Cooperation as an “important step forward” but also said that there is still a long way to go. Since the signing of the Framework for Cooperation, Iran has granted the Agency access to the Heavy Water Production Plant, which will take place next week.
Implementing Safeguards
I now want to address how we are implementing safeguards.
Let me start by stating quite clearly: implementing traditional safeguards in the same old way is no longer possible or desirable. The Agency has to adapt safeguards implementation to contemporary circumstances.
Since its inception over a half century ago, the Agency and the ways in which it implements safeguards have evolved. When I took over at the Head of the Safeguards Department at the beginning of October this year, building on previous groundwork, I determined to continue to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards by further developing their implementation under a holistic approach – we refer to this as the “State?level?concept”.
I believe it is essential to continue this direction of travel.
In essence, the State-level concept involves considering a State’s nuclear programme and nuclear-related activities in the round, rather than as the sum of its declared nuclear facilities. In doing so, we continue to act strictly within our well-established legal mandate. ?
We adopted this ‘State as a whole’ approach thanks largely to the availability of more safeguards-relevant information. For instance, we take and analyse environmental samples, we observe through satellite imagery, we scour huge amounts of open source information, have access to procurement related and third party information, and, where the additional protocol is in force, we can gain access to additional relevant sites and information. All of this information is gathered, analysed and assessed within the Department enabling us to conduct a more comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of a State’s nuclear programme to help us better focus our verification effort.
The traditional “safeguards criteria” developed in the late 1980s – which concentrate on the quantity and type of nuclear material, and the type of nuclear facilities placed under safeguards - still have a role to play in this regard. But we apply them in a less prescriptive way - a smarter way - ensuring that the wide spectrum of safeguards relevant information, including the increased knowledge about the nuclear programme of the State, is fully used in the planning, conduct and evaluation of safeguards activities in the State.?
In essence, nuclear material accountancy remains the bedrock of safeguards and should continue to be so. But it does not provide the whole picture.
This ‘State as a whole’ approach also allows us more easily to explore what room there is for achieving further efficiencies. Do we need to inspect so often, can we make better use of unannounced inspections, can remote monitoring play a more prominent role? The implementation of the additional protocol is key here too because the measures it contains enable us to build a comprehensive picture of a State’s overall nuclear programme. It gives us possibilities to further optimise safeguards implementation; to make it more efficient, but also more effective. This is beneficial to both the State and the Agency. ?
In trying to optimise safeguards implementation in a State, the relationship between the Agency and the national or regional safeguards authority can be a critical factor. Building cooperative and trusting relationships often brings tangible mutual benefits: for example, it can result in lower levels of in-field inspection activity. We are making a conscious effort at the Agency to foster more cooperative partnerships with national and regional safeguards authorities. Real progress is being made, but there is further to go. ?
Some have argued that, by moving away from a one-size-fits-all approach, the Agency will inevitably begin to discriminate in its implementation of safeguards.? But this argument is flawed.
Every Member State is “equal under the law” as determined by its safeguards agreement (and possible additional protocol thereto), but the nature and extent of its nuclear programme, will have a bearing on precisely?how?we apply safeguards in a State. To allay any fears that this “differentiation” might become “discrimination”, we are establishing clear and transparent processes with internal oversight mechanisms , including those used for State evaluation, for developing individual State-level approaches and for determining the annual verification activities to be undertaken for each State.
We continue to apply safeguards according to the legal obligations each State has freely entered into. Safeguards implementation continue to be technically based and safeguards conclusions remain independent, objective and drawn from the Agency’s own findings.
The Agency collects and processes safeguards relevant information about a State from a wide range of sources: information provided by the State itself; safeguards activities conducted by the Agency in the field and at Headquarters; and other relevant information, for example, from open sources and third parties. The Agency conducts ongoing reviews of such information and evaluates its consistency with the State’s declarations about its nuclear programme. Any anomalies, questions or inconsistencies are identified and addressed in a timely manner through follow-up action. The evaluation of all safeguards relevant information then contributes to the Agency’s understanding of the State’s nuclear fuel cycle activities and plans, the assessment and use of relevant State?specific factors and the development of State-level approaches.
The Agency evaluates the results of its activities in the context of its understanding of the State’s nuclear fuel cycle activities and plans. On the basis of this evaluation, the Agency establishes its independent findings from which an annual safeguards conclusion is drawn for each State with a safeguards agreement in force. The process for drawing safeguards conclusions is outlined in the annual Safeguards Implementation Report.
Technology
Through an R&D programme, backed by our Member States and the European Commission, we need to continue to invest in the best available scientific safeguards equipment and techniques. In this way we can improve our cost-effectiveness.??
Within the Department of Safeguards, we are currently embarked on a major overhaul and modernization of our information technology system. Once fully implemented, this will enable us to work more effectively and efficiently in house.
We are already modernizing our laboratory facilities and the supporting infrastructure at Seibersdorf in Austria. What we call the ECAS project -?Enhancing Capabilities of the Safeguards Analytical Services?– involves, amongst other things, the construction of a new Nuclear Material Laboratory building that will provide a secure, flexible, fit-for-purpose facility in which to conduct analysis of nuclear material samples.
The Future
So, what of the future?
I believe that as long as the nuclear non-proliferation regime remains robust and States are confident that their neighbours aren’t develop nuclear weapons in secret, we can succeed: but only if safeguards are credible and effective.
We must persist with efforts to encourage States that have yet to do so, to become parties to the additional protocol.
The Safeguards Department needs to continue to foster a cooperative relationship with State and regional authorities, while sharpening its focus on those who fail to cooperate.
As the Director General has emphasized on many occasions, States’ adherence to their safeguards agreements with the Agency should remain the benchmark.
Safeguards implementation by the Agency continues to evolve to strengthen its effectiveness and to improve its efficiency. In light of the continuing growth in verification demand on the Agency and budgetary constraints, improving efficiency without compromising effectiveness is a priority.
Central to these efforts is the further evolution of safeguards implementation, particularly in those States with the broader conclusion. This evolution is continuing to take place?in a structured, objective and coordinated manner, consistent with well-established principles.
My vision for safeguards in the future is one in which we continue to draw independent, robust and soundly-based conclusions safeguards based on a comprehensive evaluation of all available safeguards-relevant information, and in which non-compliance is firmly dealt with.
It is vital that we get this right. The international community demands it – future generations depend on it – and it is our joint responsibility to deliver it. ?????
Thank you for your attention.